1. Establish a clear policy framework for intelligence operations in Afghanistan: Develop a shared understanding of the role of intelligence in Afghanistan, including the purpose of intelligence operations, the scope of intelligence activities, and the limits of acceptable activities.

2. Establish a unified intelligence architecture: Establish a unified intelligence architecture that allows for the efficient and effective sharing of intelligence among all relevant stakeholders, including the military, intelligence agencies, and local and international organizations.

3. Leverage existing technology: Utilize existing technologies, such as geospatial analysis, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, to improve the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence operations in Afghanistan.

4. Strengthen intelligence training and education: Increase the training and education of intelligence personnel to ensure that they are up-to-date on the latest intelligence technologies and techniques.

5. Enhance intelligence sharing: Improve the sharing of intelligence among all relevant stakeholders, including the military, intelligence agencies, and local and international organizations.

6. Develop an effective communication strategy: Develop an effective communication strategy to ensure that intelligence operations are conducted in a timely and effective manner.

7. Develop a comprehensive intelligence strategy: Develop a comprehensive intelligence strategy that outlines the goals, objectives, and priorities of intelligence operations in Afghanistan.

8. Establish a culture of intelligence accountability: Establish a culture of intelligence accountability to ensure that intelligence operations are conducted in accordance with the established policy framework and international standards.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixing_Intel:_A_Blueprint_for_Making_Intelligence_Relevant_in_Afghanistan#Fixing Intel A Blueprint For Making Intelligence Relevant In Afghanistan

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Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
AfghanIntel Flynn Jan2010 code507 voices.pdf

The report
Author Michael T Flynn
Matthew Pottinger
Paul D. Batchelor
Editor Center for a New American Security
Publication date
January 2010
Pages 26

Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan was a report published by washington dc think tank based Center for a New American Security which examined the role and relevance of US intelligence community In progress counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and recommended a reform of analytical and information-gathering efforts. The 26-page report was written by Lieutenant General Michael T Flynnat the time a senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan, Capt. Matthew Pottingera Marine Corps officer and aide to Flynn, and Defense Intelligence Agency advisor Paul D. Batchelor. The report argues that the United States has focused too much of its intelligence resources on militant groups in the region and too little on the country of Afghanistan as a whole and on the people themselves, creating an environment in which the United States is unable to adequately conduct the war.

Contents

Fixing Intel was written in 2009 and is based on the authors’ personal experiences as well as interviews with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community. The report is intended to address fundamental issues in how the United States pursues intelligence gathering in the war in afghanistan and offers a critique as well as a series of recommendations for how the intelligence community operates. Notably, it casts doubt on the effectiveness of American intelligence resources that place the weight of their focus on studying and observing various insurgent groups, while remaining unfamiliar with the local economy, power brokers, and the relationships between various villages and ethnic groups and the government. The report was intended to inform US military commanders and intelligence officers of the inability to “answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.”

Reviews

The report labels US intelligence efforts in Afghanistan as “symbolic and ineffective”. One of the main criticisms is the lack of sufficient and effective analysts, as well as the lack of guidance from commanders to their intelligence subordinates. The absence of effective communication channels inhibits intelligence collectors’ ability to report their findings to the appropriate levels. Furthermore, the United States places too much emphasis on tracking and researching activists while disregarding “population-centric information” such as the productivity of local contractors or the state of heavily trafficked roads. In general Stanley McChrystal stated, “Our senior leaders – the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States – are not getting the right information to make decisions with… The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from sensor to policy makers.”

Recommendations

  • Employ analysts at a lower level who have the ability to move between units in the field to communicate with intelligence gatherers, such as soldiers talking to village elders, and allow them to disseminate this information to a higher command level. The authors cite the example of a 2009 us marine offensive in nawa district this was effective in gaining local trust, in part because the Marines employed analysts and other intelligence personnel at the company level.
  • Allow for a freer flow of information between various elements on the ground in Afghanistan, such as Temporary Reconstruction Teamscivil affairs troops, international aid workers, foot soldiers, etc., in order to create a more convincing picture of the situation.
  • Intelligence officers must work across a geographic rather than a functional boundary. For example, rather than separating work into areas such as counter-narcotics, terrorism and governance, intelligence officers would target specific regions of the country to better understand the environment. The authors urge commanders to view war as a violent political campaign rather than a military conflict, using the example of a election campaign.
  • Feed all compiled information into a regional command-level source that works to categorize and distribute intelligence to appropriate commands. Analysts will examine how enemy operations are evolving, the attitudes of local civilians, economic climates and levels of violence, among other things.
  • The creation of “Stability Operations Information Centers” that function under the aegis of the US Department of State. These SOICs will be responsible for providing crucial information to ground commanders about the political, military, social and economic climate of the area in which they are operating. Reports should be kept as low as possible and released every six weeks.

Reaction

Despite his rebuke of coalition efforts, the report was endorsed by defense secretary Robert Gates which allegedly called it “brilliant” and “on the spot”, however he maintained reservations about it being published via Private Publishing. think tank. James Philips, senior fellow at Heritage Foundation said, “I think it was a valid criticism, and I think it’s a long overdue effort to reform intelligence gathering and set things right.”

See too

References


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